Foreword

HON. CARLYLE E. MAW*

As this eighth annual law of the sea symposium of the San Diego
Law Review appears, delegates from more than 140 nations are
-convening in New York for the third substantive session of the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. These negotiations are most critical. Secretary of State Kissinger has said that
"no current international negotiation is more vital for the longterm stability and prosperity of our globe."'
The year 1976 will be a decisive one for the law of the sea negotiations. An eight week session of the Conference from March 15
through May 7 is now underway in New York; an additional session may be held in the summer of this year if the Conference
determines it is necessary. Unless substantial agreement is
reached at these sessions, a unique opportunity to conclude a
comprehensive treaty governing the use of some 70 percent of the
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earth's surface may be lost for the foreseeable future. Domestic
pressures are mounting for nations around the world to achieve
their oceans objectives through unilateral ,action rather than
international agreement. Since the last session of the Conference
ended in Geneva in May 1975, several coastal nations have unilaterally extended their fisheries or economic resource jurisdiction to
200 miles; others have extended their territorial seas significantly.
In the United States, the House and the Senate have passed bills
to extend United States fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles, pending
entry into force of an international law of the sea agreement, and
there is increased Congressional interest in proposed legislation
regarding deep seabed mining. A worldwide trend to unilateral
action is unmistakable.
There still remains a reasonable chance for agreement on the
essential elements of a law of the sea treaty in 1976. The informal
single negotiating text presented at the end of the Geneva session
provides a workable basis for further negotiations in Committee
II, which deals with the territorial sea, straits, the economic zone,
the continental shelf and the high seas, and in Committee III,
which deals with marine scientific research and protection of the
marine environment. In the area of dispute settlement, the informal text issued by the President of the Conference will be a useful
starting point for negotiations. Unfortunately, the single negotiating text for Committee I, involving the deep seabeds, is essentially a restatement of the position of the developing countries and
accordingly does not provide a real basis for further negotiations.
If the single negotiating text were 'the sole basis of evaluating the
possibility of success of the Conference in 1976, the prognosis would
not be good. However, at intersessional negotiations since the
Geneva session, new and more realistic texts have begun to emerge.
Hopefully, the momentum gained in these negotiations can be
caried over to the New York session.
In any protracted negotiation, a stage is reached where timing
is critical. In the law of the sea negotiations, there have been six
preparatory sessions, one organizational session and two substantive
sessions since the General Assembly called the Conference in December 1970. The time has arrived to shift from tactical bargaining positions to basic negotiations designed to reach an accommodation. Whether an agreement can be concluded will depend
largely on whether -the great majority of nations are willing to
make the political decisions necessary to accommodate the essential interests of others. Of course, no sovereign state can sacrifice
its vital interests simply for the sake of securing an agreement.
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However, on the difficult issues still separating the participants at
the Conference, there is common ground which can be reached if
the political will exists to do so.
Committee I is perhaps the principal stumbling block in the negotiations, where contentious issues include the nature and scope of
the new international organization, the powers and voting structure ,of its Assembly and Council, whether states and their nationals or only the new international organization will be entitled
to exploit the resources of the deep seabed, and the economic
effects of projected seabed production on consumers and landbased producers.
As A.V. Lowe indicates in his historical survey of the Committee
I negotiations from 1967 through 'the end of the Geneva session,
eight years of discussions and negotiations have apparently not
succeeded in bridging the gap between the developed States with
the greatest economic and political power tand the developing
States with the greatest voting power. Developed States are
unwilling to risk their national interests by subjecting deep seabed mining to the unchecked control of a new international organization; they insist upon a guaranteed right of access for all States
and their nationals to deep seabed minerals under reasonable conditions. By contrast, the single negotiating text provides for exploitation of the deep seabed to be conducted only by, or pursuant
to a discretionary decision of, the international organization.
Martin Glassner places the deep seabed argument in perspective.
He believes that much of the literature is overly optimistic about
the extent of the riches which will be harvested from the deep seabed in the foreseeable future. The bulk of the treasure on the ocean
floor is in the form of hydrocarbons on the continental margin, almost all of which are within the 200-mile economic zone, and all
of which would be subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State
under the provisions of the single negotiating text. Since revenues
from mining the manganese nodules of the deep seabed will do little
to close the gap between rich and poor, Professor Glassner suggests
that a more meaningful solution would be for coastal States to
share with the international community revenues from mineral and
petroleum exploitation of the continental margin.

Many of the developed countries, including the United States,
have indicated that they would prefer a stable international legal
framework for deep seabed mining to be established before commercial mining operations begin. At the same time, as Professor
Lowe points out, if the law of the sea negotiations drag on, the
developed countries may eventually succumb to internal political
pressures to adopt measures necessary to ensure that deep seabed
mining can commence. Currently, the nations of the world have
an opportunity to create a new legal order for the deep seabeds
and simultaneously to fashion an economic scheme under which
revenues from deep seabed mining would contribute to the development of the poorer nations. A failure of the negotiations would
result in every nation acting for itself, with no common benefit
for the international community.
The Committee II single negotiating text, as Robert Krueger
indicates, is a comprehensive and generally balanced document
which encompasses every subject dealt with by the four 1958
Geneva Conventions adopted at the first United Nations Law of
the Sea Conference plus a number of other complex subjects.
Although it contains a number of points on which there must be
further negotiation, it reflects in many respects the results of intensive informal negotiations at Geneva. The remaining problem
areas include the difficult dispute between coastal States, on the
one hand, and land-locked states and so-called "geographically
disadvantaged States" on the other, regarding access of the latter
to resources of the economic zones of neighboring coastal States.
Lewis Alexander and Robert Hodgson illuminate the difficult
problem of the geographically disadvantaged States. Their Article
illustrates the extreme complexity of determining which States
should be regarded as geographically disadvantaged and the difficulty of determining the scope of access to resources. They demonstrate that the first task -s to define what we mean by "geographically disadvantaged," since different types of disadvantage
may require different solutions.
The Committee II single negotiating text also does not provide
adequately for rational management of highly migratory fish species such as tuna. Proper utilization and conservation of highly
migratory species can only be accomplished effectively through
regional organizations that include all coastal States and others
fishing in the region, with powers of resource allocation coupled
with an effective enforcement system. A third problem in the
Committee II negotiations involves the extent of coastal State jurisdiction over the continental margin. One group of States believes
such jurisdiction should be limited to 200 miles, while another in-
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sists that it extends to the edge of the margin even beyond 200
miles. An accommodation in this area could be based upon a relatively simple formula for defining the extent of the margin, combined with an obligation upon broad margin States to share with
the international community a portion of the revenues derived from
exploitation of the mineral resources of the margin beyond 200
miles.
A further -problem in Committee II relates to the precise description of the rights of the coastal State -in the economic zone and
the juridical status of the zone. These issues are of great importance if one of the principal objectives of the negotiations is to be
realized, namely, arriving at an accommodation of coastal State
resource interests on the one hand, and international interests in
navigational and other freedoms, on the other. Maritime States
would have little incentive to accept a treaty in which the economic zone did not reflect an accommodation of all interests, but
was a mere stepping stone to more comprehensive coastal claims.
In addition, it must be recognized that the resulting treaty will be
subject to misinterpretation. To avoid the conflicts which may result, a ,general, compulsory, and binding dispute settlement procedure is necessary.
The single negotiating text for Committee III dealing with marine scientific research and protection of the marine environment
is also a fairly balanced text, but there are significant unresolved
problems. Many coastal States seek a regime which would require
coastal State consent for all scientific research in the economic
zone, while others believe that such restrictions would serve neither the interest 'of the coastal States themselves nor those of the
international community. Unencumbered scientific investigation
is critical -to our understanding and rational use of the oceans, and
the results of scientific research should be broadly disseminated.
Legitimate coastal State concerns regarding marine scientific research conducted off its coasts can be protected by -imposing upon
the researching nation clear obligations regarding the conduct and
results of this research. Finally, although significant progress has
been made on the subject of marine pollution in Committee III,
important problems remain regarding the extent of coastal State
competence to set and enforce vessel source pollution standards.
These -problems go to the heart of the underlying accommodations

between the powers of the coastal State and -the protection of
navigation.
Mark Janis deals with the vital issue of free transit through and
over straits used for international navigation and the preservation
of freedom of navigation and overflight in the economic zone from
the perspective of the world's four most powerful navies, those of
the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. He
demonstrates how geographical constraints affect the positions of
these four countries with respect to navigational freedoms.
Don Walsh's Article stresses the urgency of developing a future
oceans policy of the United States, regardless of whether the Law
of the Sea Conference reaches a successful conclusion. To anyone
who believes the Law of the Sea Conference affects only narrow
specialized interests, Mr. Walsh underlines the importance of the
oceans to the overall interests of the United States. Careful attention should be paid to his plea that more serious policy study and
planning be given to the oceans.
In addition, this San Diego Law Review symposium contains
some very thoughtful Comments with respect to the validity under international law of the mining claim made by Deepsea Ventures, Inc. and the factors affecting United States policy toward
deep seabed mining; the outstanding problem in the law of the sea
negotiations of the regime for highly migratory species, and the
effect that a 200-mile economic resource zone could have on the
American tuna industry; the -complex questions involved in attempting to create a regime for archipelagos consistent with the
interests of the world community in protecting freedom of navigation and the development of the doctrine of innocent passage and
its effect on the legality of reprisal by the United States in the
Mayaguez incident.
In summary, the editors of the San Diego Law Review have
produced a stimulating symposium at a critical time in the law of
the sea negotiations.
As Secretary Kissinger stated in his address to the American
Bar Association in Montreal:
We are at one of those rare moments when mankind has come together to devise means of preventing future conflict and shaping
its destiny rather than to solve a crisis that has occurred or to deal
with the aftermath of war. It is
a test of vision and will, and of
statesmanship. It must succeed. 2
Time may be running out. If the Conference is to succeed, nations must decide now that the time has arrived to compromise and
to conclude the negotiations.
2. Id. at 6.

